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STUDENT MATERIAL
Notes
JURISDICTION AND EXEMPTIONS UNDER THE
SURFACE MINING CONTROL AND RECLAMATION ACT
OF 1977
I. INTRODUCTION
An ever-increasing demand for energy has prompted production of coal
to rise rapidly.1 In addition, the concurrent dramatic increase in the percent-
age of coal that is surface mined demonstrates the pressing need that existed
for national legislation to control the surface effects of both deep and surface
mining.2 The Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 19771 is the pro-
duct of a six-year effort to protect the nation's economy and environment
from the increasing external impacts of the surface mining industry.4
The Act represents an earnest attempt to balance the interests of the
coal industry and its contribution to the nation's energy supply with equally
important social, economic and environmental interests of people living in the
nation's mining regions. Congress expressly recognized in SMCRA that while
''coal mining operations presently contribute significantly" to our country's
energy needs, "the expansion of coal mining.., makes even more urgent the
establishment of appropriate standards to minimize damage to the environ-
ment and to productivity of the soil and to protect the health and safety of
the public."'
Thus, while coal has played a vital part in the industrial and economic
growth of this country, the impacts of surface mining have continually pre-
sented substantial economic and environmental problems." Owners of land
adjoining surface mining activity have undoubtedly been affected the most.
Adverse effects, such as losses in property value, damage to water sources,
I Total production of coal in this country has more than doubled between 1961 (402.9 million
tons) and 1981 (814.7 million tons). See KEYSTONE COAL INDUSTRY MANUAL (McGraw-Hill 1982).
2 The percentage of coal that is produced by surface mining methods has nearly doubled bet-
ween 1961 (32.3%) and 1981 (59.4%). Id.
3 Pub. L. No. 95-87, 91 Stat. 445 (codified at 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (Supp. V 1981)) [hereinaf-
ter cited as either the Act or SMCRA].
' See generally Note, A Summary of the Legislative History of the Surface Mining Control
and Reclamation Act of 1977 and the Relevant Legal Periodical Literature, 81 W. VA. L. REv. 775
(1979).
30 U.S.C. § 1201(b) and (d) (Supp. V 1981).
H.R. No. 95-218, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 57, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
593, 595.
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vibration damage from blasting, and landslides primarily affect those living
or doing business near stripping activity. But surface mining operations have
interfered with interests beyond those of neighboring landowners. Major ex-
amples of the more far-reaching external consequences of surface mining are
pollution of streams from mine acid and silt, loss of productive farmland and
recreational areas, and an overall diminution in aesthetic quality of mined
areas.
The Act was designed to deal with these problems in three ways. First,
titles III, VIII and IX of SMCRA encourage (and fund) mining research in the
states affected. 7 Second, title IV created the Abandoned Mine Reclamation
Fund, a program supported by a severance tax on current mining operations.'
The monies collected are distributed to eligible states to reclaim lands which
were surface mined and abandoned before the passage of the Act in 1977.
Finally, the most vital to SMCRA goals, is title V, which sets out detailed en-
vironmental protection standards, penalties for noncompliance, citizen partic-
ipation provisions and a procedure for designation of certain lands as unsuit-
able for coal mining.'
The Department of Interior's agency which was created by the Act-the
Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement (OSM), is primarily
responsible for the implementation and enforcement of these legislative
goals."° The Act itself provides two stages of implementation, and OSM's in-
volvement varies with each stage. Initially, under the interim program, OSM
has been the primary regulatory agency in all states." The second, or per-
manent, stage involves federal oversight of all states with their own OSM-ap-
proved programs, along with permanent federal programs in any mining
state without an approved state program.
12
A. Issues Discussed
The effectiveness of SMCRA and the underlying federal and state regula-
tory programs is primarily dependent upon the breadth of the Act's author-
ity. Simply stated, if the Act's provisions do not cover a particular mining op-
eration, OSM is without jurisdictional authority to regulate it. Therefore, an
issue of major concern that has arisen since the passage of SMCRA is what
activities and entities are within the jurisdiction of the Act and OSM regula-
tion.
This Note examines the major jurisdiction and exemption questions
30 U.S.C. §§ 1221-1229, 1311-1316, 1321-1328 (Supp. V 1981).
'Id. §§ 1231-1243.
'Id. §§ 1251-1279.
0 Id. § 1211.
" Id. § 1252.
12 Id. §§ 1254 and 1255.
[Vol. 86
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presented under SMCRA. Initially, the Act's scope of authority is dependent
upon how the terms "operator" and "surface coal mining operations" are de-
fined. 3 Only if an entity or activity falls within these definitions must it
follow SMCRA's permitting and performance requirements. At first glance,
these provisions do not appear to implicitly exempt any surface mine opera-
tor or operation by definitional lack of jurisdiction. But as cases illustrate,
OSM's jurisdictional reach under the definitions of "operator" and "surface
coal mining operations" have been hotly litigated issues, especially regarding
off-site support facilities such as coal processing and loading units."
Other major areas covered by this Note are the express exemptions
under section 528 of the Act."5 Three types of surface coal operations are ex-
plicitly not subject to SMCRA. Basically, these are: 1) noncommercial land-
owner extractions;16 2) operations which affect two acres or less;1 7 and 3) oper-
ations where coal is removed incidental to government-financed construction
projects. 8 The first and last of these three exemptions have met with rela-
tively little controversy and will be discussed in less detail. 9 The second, the
"two acre" exemption, has been the subject of constant litigation since the
passage of the Act and will be discussed at greater length. 0
II. EXEMPT BY DEFINITIONAL LACK OF JURISDICTION
A. Who Are "Operators"?-Section 701(13)
Challenges by some who feel that they are not "operators" have been
raised in spite of the simple and straightforward language used in the defini-
tion. The Act defines an operator as "any person, partnership, or corporation
engaged in coal mining who removes or intends to remove more than two
hundred and fifty tons of coal from the earth by coal mining within twelve
Is See 30 U.S.C. § 1291(13) and (28) (Supp. V 1981).
" See supra notes 21-103 and accompanying text. See generally McMillan & Means, The
Outer Limits of OSM Jurisdiction" Regulation of Operations Separated From a Minesite, 1 EAS-
TERN MIN. L. INST. 4-1 (1980); Barry, The Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 and
the Office of Surface Mining: Moving Targets or Immovable Objects?, 27 ROCKY MT. MIN. L. INST.
169 (1982).
" 30 U.S.C. § 1278 (Supp. V 1981).
16 Id. § 1278(1).
17 Id. § 1278(2).
Id. § 1278(3).
,' See supra notes 104-24 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 125-63 and accompanying text. SMCRA and the regulations also do not
cover any operation which mines coal incident to the extraction of some other mineral, and the
coal mined is less than 16.6% of the total minerals mined. SMCRA § 701(28), 30 U.S.C. § 1291(28)
(Supp. V 1981); 48 Fed. Reg. 20,400 (1983). However, this exemption is built into the definition of
"surface coal mining operations" and will be dealt with only as it becomes relevant to the discus-
sion of that definition. This Note also does not address the issues surrounding certain "lands"
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consecutive calendar months in any one location."'" The regulations promul-
gated by OSM define "operator" in essentially the same language, clarifying
that it also includes those who remove coal from refuse or gob piles.'
In some cases, the application of the "operator" and "operations" defini-
tions are at issue simultaneously.? However, the more ambiguous "opera-
tions" definition is more frequently litigated, but not due solely to any
greater ambiguity of the "operations" definition. Other factors help explain
this result. First, SMCRA does not rely heavily upon its definition of "opera-
tor" to find jurisdictional authority; instead, SMCRA relies predominantly on
its "surface coal mining operations" definition, which gives it broad jurisdic-
tion over mining activities. The nucleus of SMCRA, the performance stan-
dards, were drafted to apply to "operations."24 More important is the fact
that "operations" includes many support facilities not involved in the actual
removal of coal. Thus, there are many instances when the definition of "oper-
ator," which is dependent upon intent to remove or actual removal of coal, is
not a material issue.2
Nevertheless, there are some situations where jurisdiction may be solely
dependent upon the definition of "operator." The only real definitional issue
here is not determining who is an operator,2 but rather when one is con-
sidered an operator. Unquestionably, and by the Act's explicit language, one
who removes 250 tons of coal or more is within the definition. However, since
the section also says "or intends to remove," the question of timing is not al-
ways so clear.
Two cases which illustrate the ambiguity inherent in the "intent" lan-
guage are Russell Prater Land Co. I and L. C. Coal v. OSM.21 In the first case,
the Interior Board of Surface Mining and Reclamation Appeals (IBSMA) held
that proof of intention to mine, together with a disturbance of the surface,
was sufficient to establish OSM jurisdiction over the site. The proof of intent
in Prater was that two company officials had told on OSM inspector that they
intended to open a mine at the site.' The Board, while noting that in this
21 SMCRA, § 701(13); 30 U.S.C. § 1291(13) (Supp. V 1981).
- 30 C.F.R. § 701.5 (1982). See also United States v. Devils Hole, Inc., 548 F. Supp. 451 (E.D.
Pa. 1982); United States v. H.G.D. & J. Mining Co., 561 F. Supp. 315 (S.D. W. Va.).
E.g., Shawnee Coal Co. v. Andrus, 661 F.2d 1083 (6th Cir. 1981); Sam Blankenship, 5
IBSMA 32 (1983).
24 See 30 U.S.C. § 1265 (Supp. V 1981).
See also 44 Fed. Reg. 14,916 (1979) ("The word 'operator' is not used in all places at which
responsibilities are imposed on those mining coal.")
' Determining who is an operator is often an evidentiary issue though. See, e.g., Harry
Smith Constr. Co. v. OSM, 78 IBLA 27, 31-32 nn.11 & 12 (1983); Watkins v. OSM, No. NX 0-225-R
(Sept. 30, 1980).
2 3 IBSMA 124, 88 Interior Dec. 498 (1981).
No. CH 0-199-R (Oct. 1, 1980).
3 IBSMA at 126, 88 Interior Dec. at 499.
[Vol. 86
4
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 86, Iss. 3 [1984], Art. 18
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol86/iss3/18
JURISDICTION AND EXEMPTIONS
type of situation it may be possible to produce facts to deprive OSM of its au-
thority, did not specify what facts'would trigger this loss of jurisdiction. It
most likely was referring to two situations: when a company's intent was to
remove less than 250 tons, or if the operation was not going to disturb more
than two acres. In those circumstances, the company's "intent" would not
subject it to the Act. 0 However, the burden is ultimately on the operator to
prove that the amount of coal mined will be (or was) less than 250 tons 1 or
that the area affected will be (or was) less that two acres.12 Jurisdiction is es-
sentially presumed unless the miner can clearly establish otherwise.3
A comparison of Prater with the second case, L.C. Coal v. OSM, 4 demon-
strates the ambiguity of the "intent" aspect of section 701(13). L.C. Coal had
begun mining a previously abandoned deep mine35 to determine whether coal
could be safely removed. The mine had been abandoned by another company
after it had discovered that the roof of the mine could not be bolted properly.
The administrative law judge (ALJ) held that there was no basis on which
OSM could claim jurisdiction, since the evidence showed that, after L.C. Coal
had removed only 120 tons of coal, it had stopped mining. The ALJ stated,
"[i]t is obvious that the Applicant did not intend to remove more than 250
tons of coal per year if the mining could not be done safely." 6 But this state-
ment does not appear to comply with the statutory definition of "operator."
The facts of the L. C. Coal case clearly indicate that the company intended to
remove more than 250 tons as long as the mine could be operated safely.
Thus, the confusion evolves as to when to judge intent-before the removal
as in Prater, or after the fact, as the ALJ seems to suggest in L. C. Coal. If in-
tent is to be examined after the fact, the "intent" provision is superfluous.
For example, if OSM must wait to determine its authority, based upon a com-
pany's assertion that it is unsure whether it will be able to mine a particular
site successfully, then the only effective part of the definition is the "actual
removal" criterion. Therefore, the test is necessarily that expressed by the
Board in Prater-OSM need not wait until coal is actually removed to exer-
cise its authority. The burden of proving no intent to mine more than 250
tons is on the coal company.
See 30 U.S.C. §§ 1278(2) and 1291(13) (Supp. V 1981).
s, See James Moore, 1 IBSMA 216, 86 Interior Dec. 369 (1979); see also Squire Baker, 1
IBSMA 279, 86 Interior Dec. 551 (1979).
2 See Titan Coal Corp. v. OSM, 78 IBLA 205 (1984); Harry Smith Constr. Co. v. OSM, 78
IBLA 27 (1983); Sam Blankenship, 5 IBSMA 32, 90 Interior Dec. 174 (1983); Virginia Fuels, Inc., 5
IBSMA 1 (1983); Virginia Fuels, Inc., 4 IBSMA 185, 89 Interior Dec. 604 (1982).
- See Harry Smith Constr. Co. v. OSM, 78 IBLA 27 (1983); see also 43 C.F.R. § 4.1171 (1982).
No. CH 0-199-R (Oct. 1, 1980).
The surface effects of deep mines are also covered by the Act. See 30 U.S.C. § 1266 (Supp.
V 1981).
L.C. Coal, at 2 (emphasis added).
See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
1984]
5
Hedges: Jurisdiction and Exemptions under the Surface Mining Control and
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1984
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
A final question concerning the "operator" definition focuses on the oppo-
site end of the time line. At what point does one cease being an operator un-
der section 701(13)? This issue was raised in Shawnee Coal Co. v. Andrus
before the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. 8 The district court had
granted Shawnee Coal injunctive relief against OSM enforcement of some
cessation orders. Shawnee asserted that OSM did not possess jurisdiction
over them. 9 Its claim was partially based on its contention that it was not an
"operator" under section 701(13). Shawnee had mined in excess of 250 tons
between August, 1977, and December, 1978, when it closed its surface mine
on the site. Shawnee continued to operate an off-site tipple where it pro-
cessed both its own stockpiled coal and coal from contracted mines. OSM in-
spectors issued a number of notices of violation (NOV) to Shawnee in Septem-
ber, 1979, which were based upon violations at the tipple site.
This timetable illustrates the basis for Shawnee's argument. At least
nine months before the issuance of the NOVs, the company had ceased re-
moving (or intending to remove) any coal from the location. Therefore, while
it had unquestionably been an operator under section 701(13) in 1977 and
1978, the company contended that it had lost this status once it closed its
mine. The circuit court unequivocally rejected this argument, relying on the
fact that at the time the NOVs were issued, Shawnee was still reclaiming the
mine site. This was the only logical conclusion the court could have reached,
since the Act's environmental performance standards are ultimately directed
toward reclamation. 0 If OSM authority ended with the final removal of coal it
would be impossible to enforce the primary goals of the Act.
The counter-argument on this issue would be that the bonding provisions
of the Act,41 and not the penalty provisions, provide OSM authority over re-
clamation sites. Thus, while the company ceased being an operator under the
Act, OSM still had enforcement leverage over it via their unreleased bond.
But the performance standards and penalty provisions of SMCRA refute this
position since, under title V, all operations are required to meet all "criteria
as are necessary to achieve reclamation" under the Act," and "any permittee
who violates any ... provision of this title, may [or shall] be assessed a civil
penalty .. . ."' Therefore, while the bonds required under the Act are an in-
centive for the company to reclaim (and surety for OSM), the jurisdictional
authority of OSM does not end with the last shovel-load of coal."
661 F.2d 1083 (6th Cir. 1981).
Id. at 1093.
40 See 30 U.S.C. §§ 1257(d), 1258, 1259, 1265 (Supp. V 1981).
II See id. §§ 1259 and 1269.
42 Id. § 1265(23).
,1 Id. § 1268(a).
44 See Sam Blankenship, 5 IBSMA 32, 90 Interior Dec. 174 (1983) (Even "a pure reclamation
operation can claim no greater exemption than could the coal removal operation upon which it is
based.") Id. at 37 n.1; see also Grafton Coal Co., 3 IBSMA 175, 88 Interior Dec. 613 (1981).
[Vol. 861000
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In summary, the definitional problems related to section 701(13), standing
alone, have been relatively rare. The definition has not been the subject of
much confusion or litigation, primarily due to its secondary importance to the
"surface coal mining operation" definition discussed below. Accordingly, no
changes in the "operator" definition in either the Act or the regulations have
been officially proposed.
B. What Are "Surface Coal Mining Operations "?-Section 701(28)
It is not as clear that the court of appeals in Shawnee Coal Co. v. An-
drus'5 could have found jurisdiction over the off-site tipple if the "operator"
status of Shawnee had already ended. The court, however, was not faced with
this issue because Shawnee was still reclaiming the mine site when the NOVs
were issued. Additionally, the court held that the tipple itself, as a "surface
coal mining operation" within the definition in section 701(28),"6 was therefore
subject to the agency's enforcement powers. As emphasized by the Shawnee
court, regardless of who the person or entity is, the mining activity is in-
dependently covered under SMCRA."7
Section 701(28) is the "heart of OSM's regulatory authority."48 The term
''surface coal mining operations" is used constantly throughout the Act and
has by far the most lengthy definition. 9 Subsection (A), which lists the activi-
4 661 F.2d 1083 (6th Cir. 1981).
30 U.S.C. § 1291(28) (Supp. V 1981).
:7 661 F.2d at 1094.
' McMillan & Means, supra note 14, at 4-8.
SMCRA, § 701(28); 30 U.S.C. § 1291(28) provides as follows:
"surface coal mining operations" means-
(A) activities conducted on the surface of lands in connection with a surface coal
mine or subject to the requirements of section 516 [30 USCS § 1266] surface operations
and surface impacts incident to an underground coal mine, the products of which enter
commerce or the operations of which directly or indirectly affect interstate commerce.
Such activities include excavation for the purpose of obtaining coal including such com-
mon methods as contour, strip, auger, mountain-top removal, box cut, open pit, and area
mining, the uses of explosives and blasting, and in situ distillation or retorting, leaching
or other chemical or physical processing, and the cleaning, concentrating, or other pro-
cessing or preparation, loading of coal for interstate commerce at or near the mine site:
Provided, however, That such activities do not include the extraction of coal incidental
to the extraction of other minerals where coal does not exceed 16-2/3 per centum of the
tonnage of minerals removed for purposes of commercial use or sale or coal explorations
subject to section 512 of this Act [30 USCS § 12621; and
(B) the areas upon which such activities occur or where such activities disturb the
natural land surface. Such areas shall also include any adjacent land the use of which is
incidental to any such activities, all lands affected by the construction of new roads or
the improvement or use of existing roads to gain access to the site of such activities and
for haulage, and excavations, workings, impoundments, dams, ventilation shafts, entry-
ways, refuse banks, dumps, stockpiles, overburden piles, spoil banks, culm banks, tail-
ings, holes or depressions, repair areas, storage areas, processing areas, shipping areas
19841 1001
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ties that are considered within the definition, has received the most atten-
tion. Subsection (B), which speaks in terms of areas rather than activities, is
somewhat complementary and adds to the definition any adjacent areas used
incidental to the activities in subsection (A).5 As in the Shawnee case, the pri-
mary focal point of litigation has been on the subsection (A) issue of what ac-
tivities come within the Act. Even more precisely, the real subject of contro-
versy between OSM and the coal industry has been whether off-site proces-
sing plants and other support facilities should generally be included in the
definition.
In Shawnee, the court had little trouble concluding that Congress in-
tended off-site tipples to be considered as surface coal mining operations. For
support, the court cited In re Permanent Surface Mining Regulation Litiga-
tion"1 and merely stated that for the reasons outlined in that decision,
Shawnee's tipple was within OSM's jurisdiction.2 The decision relied on by
the court in Shawnee is one of a series of District of Columbia district court
and circuit court decisions dealing with the validity and interpretation of the
Act and more than 100 different parts of the regulations promulgated under
it.' The only one relevant here is a decision in May 1980 by Judge Flannery,
which was relied on by the Shawnee court and is generally known as Flan-
nery II."
In Flannery II, one issue was the interpretation of the section 701(28) def-
inition- "surface coal mining operations." This definition, particularly with
regard to off-site processing facilities, has been the subject of various inter-
pretations by the administrations of OSM and the IBSMA, and by at least
three federal district courts and one circuit court of appeals.55 The contro-
versy first arose under the Act's 701(28) definition and its parallel definition
in the interim regulations.56 The portions of the definition which have gener-
ated the controversy are: "activities conducted on the surface of lands in con-
and other areas upon which are sited structures, facilities, or other property or mater-
ials on the surface, resulting from or incident to such activities.
(emphasis added.)
' See, e.g., Alabama Power Co., No. NX 9-82-0 (Jan. 30, 1980); Badger Coal Co., No. CH
0-164-R (July 17, 1980); Badger Coal Co., No. CH 0-92-P (Aug. 25, 1980). See also infra note 68.
51 No. 79-1144 (D.D.C. May 16, 1980).
5 Shawnee Coal, 661 F.2d at 1094.
See In re Surface Mining Regulation Litigation, 452 F. Supp. 327 (D.D.C. 1978); 456 F.
Supp. 1301 (D.D.C. 1978); 627 F.2d 1346 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (all dealing with the interim regulations).
See also In re Permanent Surface Mining Regulation Litigation, 13 E.R.C. 1586 (D.D.C. Aug. 21,
1979), aff'd, 617 F.2d 807 (D.C. Cir. 1980); 14 E.R.C. 1083 (D.D.C. Feb. 26, 1980); 14 E.R.C. 1813
(D.C. Cir. July 10, 1980); 653 F.2d 514 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Peabody Coal Co. v. Watt,
102 S. Ct. 106 (1981). See also In re Permanent Surface Mining Regulation II, No. 79-1144 (83-1092)
(D.D.C. filed April 14, 1983) (pending litigation).
No. 79-1144 (D.D.C. May 16, 1980); see also Barry, supra note 14, at 280.
See infra notes 75-81 and accompanying text. See generally Barry, supra note 14, at 309-14.
The interim regulations can be found in 42 Fed. Reg. 62,639 (1977). 30 C.F.R. § 700.5 defines
[Vol. 861002
8
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 86, Iss. 3 [1984], Art. 18
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol86/iss3/18
JURISDICTION AND EXEMPTIONS
nection with a surface coal mine .... Such activities include ... leaching or
other chemical or physical processing, and the cleaning, concentrating, or
other processing or preparation, loading of coal for interstate commerce at or
near the mine site."57 In Western Engineering,8 the IBSMA decided that a
company which owned a river terminal that received strip-mined coal for pre-
paration and loading onto barges was not a "surface coal mine operation."
The Board reasoned that because of the ambiguity in the statutory and regu-
latory definitions, primarily in the phrases "in connection with a surface
mine" and "at or near the mine site," the matter should be resolved in favor
of the company."
This was not the first request for clarification of these two ambiguous
phrases. During the drafting stage of the permanent regulations attention
was directed to the phrase "at or near" and the fact that it was easily subject
to different interpretations." The first interpretation, one favored by the coal
industry, was that the phrase "at or near" modified the entire sentence seg-
ment: "and the cleaning, concentrating, or other processing or preparation,
loading of coal for interstate commerce .... " This interpretation would have
the effect of allowing OSM jurisdiction over only those loading facilities and
processing plants which are located on or near the minesite.
However, OSM, in the preamble to the permanent regulations, took the
opposite position that "at or near" only modified the phrase "loading of coal
for interstate commerce .. . ."' This broader interpretation allows OSM con-
trol over all processing plants as long as they are "in connection with" mine
operations, regardless of the geographical proximity ("at or near") to the
mines they serve. Only loading facilities are subject to both the "at or near"
and the "in connection with" criteria before finding jurisdiction.
The legislative history of SMCRA gives little insight into whether Con-
gress intended coverage of processing plants to be dependent upon "near-
ness" to the mine site. However, somewhat indicative of the position that
Congress intended what is now the broad OSM interpretation is a House In-
terior and Insular Affairs Committee Report which states that Public Law
95-87 "would enact a set of national environmental performance standards to
be applied to all coal mining operations ... (1) Covering all coal surface min-
ing (contour, mountaintop, area stripping and open-pit operations) and the
"surface coal mining operations" in virtually the same language as the statutory definition. See
Fed. Reg. 62,676 (1977).
57 30 U.S.C. § 1291(28)(A) (emphasis added).
1 IBSMA 202, 86 Interior Dec. 336 (1979).
86 Interior Dec. at 341.
See 44 Fed. Reg. 14,928 (1979).
" See id. at 14,915. ("The Office interprets the Act as setting no territorial limitation on its
jurisdiction over other facilities identified in the statutory definition preceding 'loading of coal."')
See also id. at 14.928.
1984] 1003
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surface impacts from underground mines and coal processing .... ." There-
fore, it is arguable that anything not expressly exempted was intended to be
covered.
The Board in Western, aware of the interpretation favored by OSM,
found it unpersuasive, especially since the permanent regulations and their
preamble were not published until after the violations were filed against
Western. 3 Moreover, the Board noted that OSM had stated its above-men-
tioned interpretation only in the preamble;" the agency did not change the
wording of the definition for the permanent regulation. The interim defini-
tion construed in Western had been codified (unamended) into the permanent
regulations;65 thus, the Board generally ruled that OSM jurisdiction required
both a connection and geographic proximity.6
Flannery II was decided approximately one year after the Western case.
Judge Flannery resolved the dispute in favor of the OSM position, stating
that "at or near the minesite" referred only to the loading of coal."1 According
to Judge Flannery, processing plants come under OSM jurisdiction when only
one prerequisite is met-that they are operated "in connection with" a min-
ing operation. 8
Apparently, the Board was not persuaded by Judge Flannery's concur-
rence with the OSM interpretation. Two weeks after Flannery II, the IBSMA
decided Drummond Coal Co.69 There, the Board ruled that before any proces-
sing plant comes under OSM jurisdiction it must pass two tests: "Its activi-
ties must be conducted in connection with a surface coal mine, and the plant
must be located at or near the minesite."1 With the Drummond decision, the
Board was no longer going to merely rule, as it did in Western, that the lan-
guage was ambiguous. Rather, the Board firmly decided in favor of the coal
industry's interpretation of section 701(28) and instituted what was known as
the Drummond two-part test.
62 H.R. No. 95-218, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 57, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
593, 595 (emphasis added).
I See 86 Interior Dec. at 340-41 n.9.
UId.
44 Fed. Reg. 15,313 (1979).
Thoroughfare Coal Co., 3 IBSMA 72, 88 Interior Dec. 406, (1981); Falcon Coal Co., 2 IBSMA
406, 87 Interior Dec. 669 (1980); Wolverine Coal Co., 2 IBSMA 325, 87 Interior Dec. 554 (1980);
Roberts Bros. Coal Co., 2 IBSMA 284, 87 Interior Dec. 439 (1980); Bethlehem Mines Corp., 2
IBSMA 215, 87 Interior Dec. 380 (1980).
11 In re Permanent Surface Mining Regulation Litigation, No. 79-1144, slip op. at 52 (D.D.C.
May 16, 1980).
Judge Flannery also noted that subsection (B) of section 701 gave OSM an additional basis
for jurisdiction over processing plants not "at or near" the mine. Id. at 52-53.
" 2 IBSMA 96, 87 Interior Dec. 196 (1980).
70 Id. at 101, 87 Interior Dec. at 198.
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In Drummond, the first part of the test, the "connection" criterion, was
easy enough to find since Drummond Coal owned both the processing facility
and the mine supplying it. The second criterion, "nearness," gave the Board
more of a problem.7' The mines involved were between nine and thirty miles
from the facility. If "nearness" was considered solely in terms of geographi-
cal proximity, nine to thirty miles away may be stretching the common sense
meaning of "near." However, the Board, while conceding that geographical
distance was relevant, took a more functional approach to determining "near-
ness." The more "functionally and economically integrated" the facility was
with the mines, the nearer it was. This balancing or sliding-scale approach,
which into consideration many circumstances, including geographical
distance, percentage of coal coming from mines connected to the facility, the
dependence of the facility on the continued operation of such connected
mines, and the nature and extent of activities carried on at the coal facility.
Subsequent Board decisions placed very little emphasis on geographical
distance though, relying almost exclusively on factors relating to the func-
tional and economic integration between the facility and mine(s).
2
One reason that distance became relatively unimportant was because the
Drummond decision involved mines nine to thirty miles from the facility.
Since this benchmark case involved such substantial distances, this factor be-
came somewhat immaterial to later cases where the distances were less. 3 In
theory, though, the distance should still be relevant under the Board's test.
For example, the further the facility is from the mine, the degree of func-
tional and economic integration required to find it "near" should be greater.
The most persuasive argument for this exclusive emphasis on looking at inte-
gration is that the lack of express geographical distance or other definition of
the term "near" in the Act or regulations means that a functional rather than
geographical line was intended to be used.
74
The next significant development in this area was the reversal of Drum-
mond by a federal district court in Alabama. 75 First, the court disagreed with
the Board's functional approach to the term "near." The court reasoned that
because the phrase "in connection with" already required an inquiry into
whether there was an economic, legal or some other functional relationship,
to interpret "near" to mean essentially the same thing makes its inclusion in
the Act and regulation redundant and unnecessary. Rather, the court ruled
" Id. at 102, 87 Interior Dec. at 198-99.
,2 See, e.g., Bethlehem Mines Corp., 2 IBSMA 215, 87 Interior Dec. 380 (1980); Wolverine
Coal Co., 2 IBSMA 325, 87 Interior Dec. 554 (1980); Falcon Coal Co., 2 IBSMA 406, 87 Interior Dec.
669 (1980).
'3 See, e.g., Ross Tipple Co., Nos. NX 9-17-P & NX 9-49-R (Oct. 29, 1980), rev'd, 3 IBSMA 322,
88 Interior Dec. 851 (1981).
' See Reitz Coal Co., 3 IBSMA 260, 266 n.5, 88 Interior Dec. 745, 748 n.5 (1981).
, Drummond Coal Co. v. Andrus, No. CV 80-M-0829 (N.D. Ala. April 20, 1981).
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that "it is plain that the Act and regulations intended 'near' to describe loda-
tion of a processor with respect to a mine rather than its functional relation-
ship to a mine."'" While finding Drummond's mines (nine to thirty miles away)
not to be "near," the court did not define what geographical proximity would
constitute a processing plant being "near" a mine. Nevertheless, the Board
appears to have been at least partially persuaded by the Drummond court
that "near" should be primarily a geographical test rather than a functional
one.
77
Additionally, though, while the court disagreed with the Board's meaning
of "near," it did agree with the Board's two-part test. That is, it followed the
interpretation that "at or near" was intended to modify not only "loading"
but the full "processing" phrase. This was the first court decision after Flan-
nery II to interpret the definition of "surface coal mining operations," and
the Drummond court took the opposite view of the one taken by Judge Flan-
nery.
However, this one-to-one split of authority did not remain for long. The
Sixth Circuit decided Shawnee Coal Co. v. Andrus7' five months after the
Drummond decision; with little discussion, the court sided with Judge Flan-
nery. Shawnee's tipple was held to be a "surface coal mining operation" with-
out any finding that it must be "near" the mines.79
The debate became even more weighted in favor of OSM's position that
"near" only modified "loading facilities" with the Debord v. Dinco Sales deci-
sion in September, 1982. 0 The Federal District Court for the Eastern District
of Kentucky found that the Board's interpretation that section 701(28) re-
quired the company's processing tipple to be "at or near" the mine site was
clearly erroneous. The Debord court, citing Shawnee Coal as the proper in-
terpretation, stated that the Sixth Circuit had correctly construed the Act
"to encompass off-site processing operations such as here, finding that Con-
gress intended for tippling operations to fall within the Act's gambit."'"
1. The Revised Regulation
It had become obvious to OSM during the Carter administration, and
even before most of the aforementioned court decisions, that the only way to
resolve the "at or near" controversy was to amend the regulations to clarify
the "operations" definition's meaning and, hence, solve OSM's jurisdictional
" Id. at 6.
See Reitz Coal Co., 3 IBSMA 260, 88 Interior Dec. 745 (1981); Ross Tipple Co., 3 IBSMA
322, 88 Interior Dec. 851 (1981).
7' 661 F.2d 1083 (6th Cir. 1981).
7' Id. at 1094.
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confusion."2 In its first attempt to clarify the permanent regulation, OSM pro-
posed to amend the "surface co~l mining operations" definition to comply
with its longstanding interpretation as stated in the preamble to the original
permanent regulations,' that the term "at or near" only modified "loading of
coal." To accomplish this purpose the only revision necessary was to simply
incorporate the phrase "loading of coal for interstate commerce at or near
the mine site" into a separate sentence. 4 Then the "at or near" proximity re-
quirement unquestionably would apply only to loading facilities.
The June, 1980, proposed revision was a casualty to the change in admin-
istrations. President Reagan's actions to curb the number of federal regula-
tions effectively suspended this amended definition.8 However, the massive
overhaul of the federal surface mining program by the Reagan-Watt adminis-
tration brought a renewal of this same proposed revision in the section 700.5
regulatory definition.8 The proposed change was announced in the Federal
Register on June 25, 1982, but the revision was again forestalled. This time,
the proposed revision was only a small part of a series of OSM-proposed chan-
ges throughout the entire surface mining regulatory scheme. 7 To settle a
lawsuit filed by the National Wildlife Federation,88 OSM agreed to prepare a
supplemental environmental impact statement (EIS) to assess the effects of
the massive regulatory changes.
The supplemental EIS assessed the impact of all proposed regulations
and revisions which were published in the Federal Register between July 1,
1981, and June 25, 1982.89 On January 20, 1983, OSM released final drafts of
the regulations." The revised "surface coal mining operations" definition was
eventually approved and reached final publication in the Federal Register in
May, 1983.1 Consequently, the regulatory definition of "surface coal mining
operations" has its much needed "at or near" revision. The revised regula-
tion, however, does not make a clean break from past problems. Admittedly,
it will be clear under the new definition that OSM authority is not dependent
upon a facility being "near" the mine site, unless it is a loading facility. But
82 See 45 Fed. Reg. 42,333 (1980).
,3 See 44 Fed. Reg. 14,915 (1979).
See 45 Fed. Reg. 42,335 (1980). The revised portion reading: "and the cleaning, concentrat-
ing or other processing or preparation [of coal. Such activities also include] the loading of coal for
interstate commerce at or near the mine site." (revision in brackets.)
See ENV'T REP. 115.0101 (BNA) (1982).
47 Fed. Reg. 27, 692 (1982).
See Special Report, ENV'T REP. 1684 (BNA) (1983).
National Wildlife Fed'n v. Watt, No. 82-0320 (D.D.C. filed Feb. 3, 1982).
80 See OSM, U.S. DEPT. OF THE INTERIOR, PROPOSED REVISIONS TO THE PERMANENT PROGRAM
REGULATIONS IMPLEMENTING SECTION 501(b) OF THE SURFACE MINING CONTROL AND RECLAMATION
ACT OF 1977, Vol. I, p. V (1983) [hereinafter cited as PROPOSED REVISIONS].
2 Id., vol. III.
9, 48 Fed. Reg. 20,392, 20,400 (1983).
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there is still the need for guidance as to what facilities are "near" enough to
be within OSM jurisdiction.2
Many of these facilities may be on-site, which presents no jurisdiction
problem since they are "at" the mine. But which off-site loading facilities are
"near" is not so clear. The term obviously gave the Board and courts difficul-
ty before. 3 Now, because it will only apply to loading facilities does not mean
it will be any easier to define. One solution engineered by OSM was to pro-
vide an alternative way to reach loading facilities under the Act. Based upon
subsection (B) of section 701(28),"4 OSM has generated a new definition in the
regulations- defining "support facilities."95 One type of support facility is
coal loading facilities. However, under this definition a loading facility is
regulated only if it is "resulting from, or incident to, an activity identified in
paragraph (a) of the definition of 'surface coal mining operations.' "' And
OSM interprets this phrase to connote an element of proximity to the opera-
tion. 8 It is highly questionable whether there can be any discernable dif-
ference, at least one capable of consistent application by the Board and
I The issue of what activities are "in connection with" a surface coal mine is also not always
so clear. See, e.g., Virginia Iron, Coal and Coke Co., 2 IBSMA 165, 171-72, 87 Interior Dec. 327, 330
(1980); Dayton Mining Co. v. OSM, No. NX 0-252-R (Oct. 3, 1980). See also 48 Fed. Reg. 20,393
(1983) (OSM listing of examples of relationships which meet their interpretation of "in connection
with").
,3 See supra notes 71-77 and accompanying text.
" The language in subsection (B) upon which OSM relies for jurisdiction over off-site loading
facilities is as follows:
such areas shall also include any adjacent land the use of which is incidental to any such
activities .... and other areas upon which are sited structures, facilities, or other pro-
perty or materials on the surface, resulting from or incident to such activities [those ac-
tivities listed in subsection (A)].
30 U.S.C. § 1291(28)(B) (Supp. V 1981) (emphasis and bracketed material added).
11 48 Fed. Reg. 20,392, 20,401 (1983) (to be codified at 30 C.F.R. § 701.5). The new definition
reads as follows:
Support facilities means those facilities resulting from, or incident to, an activity
identified in Paragrah (a) of the definition of "surface coal mining operations" in § 700.5
of this chapter and the areas upon which such facilities are located. Support facilities
may consist of, but need not be limited to, the following facilities: mine buildings; bath
houses; coal loading facilities; coal crushing and sizing facilities; coal storage facilities;
equipment and storage facilities; fan buildings; hoist buildings; sheds, shops, and other
buildings; facilities used to treat and store water for mine consumption; and railroads,
surface conveyor systems, chutes, aerial tramways, or other transportation facilities,
but not including roads. "Resulting from or incident to" an activity connotes an element
of proximity to that activity.
Id. at 20,401 (emphasis added).
" See also 48 Fed. Reg. 20,400-01 (1983) (new definition of coal preparation plant includes
loading facilities if they are associated with a plant that separates coal from its impurities).
" See supra note 95.
" Id. See also 48 Fed. Reg. 20,397 (1983).
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courts, between a "proximity" test under the "support facilities" definition
and the "near" test under the "operations" definition. Being "incident to"
under the Act and the new "support facility" definition would more likely
refer to a functional relationship.9 That is, if a facility is economically inte-
grated or related with the mining operations, then it is "incident to" that op-
eration.
OSM, however, apparently is seeking to leave flexibility in the defini-
tions. ' Moreover, the current OSM position appears to be that tipples en-
gaged in loading, as well as those storing, crushing and screening, generally
do not need regulated."0' The rationale for this particular relinquishment of
regulatory authority is two-fold: 1) that these processes are unlikely to create
any toxic discharges since they use very little water; and 2) even if placed
outside OSM control, these facilities may still be answerable to the Environ-
mental Protection Agency and various state agencies. 2
However, the Environmental Impact Statement comments accompanying
the proposed regulations also admit there is "the potential for locally signifi-
cant adverse impacts with regard to uncontrolled acid and toxic drainage
from coal storage piles located at unregulated crushing and screening
facilities." ' Therefore, the better approach, from an environmentally
cautious standpoint, would be to maintain consistency with the intent and ob-
jectives of SMCRA and keep these facilities clearly within OSM jurisdiction,
rather than encounter constant litigation over a "proximity" text when OSM
does find the need to curb harmful effects at such a facility."4
1 Being "incident" is defined as "dependent on or appertaining to another thing; directly and
immediately relating to or involved in something else though not an essential part of it."
WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1976). See also Mola v. Reiley, 100 N.J. Super.
343, 241 A.2d 861 (1968) (similar definition).
In Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980), the Court stated: "In cases of statutory con-
struction we begin, of course, with the language of the statute. And 'unless otherwise defined,
words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning.' "Id. at 308
(citations omitted).
' 48 Fed. Reg. 20,397 (1983).
,o, See 48 Fed. Reg. 20,394-95 (1983). "OSM intends to reach only those activities that actually
clean, concentrate, process, or prepare coal; that is, operations which separate coal from its impur-
ities." Id. at 20,395. OSM has effectuated this change through its new regulatory definition of coal
preparation plants. See 48 Fed. Reg. 20,392-402 (1983). "Under this definition, coal loading, crush-
ing, sizing and other such activities do not constitute coal processing or preparation unless they
result in separation of coal from its impurities." Id. at 20,394.
, See PROPOSED REVISIONS, supra note 89, vol. I at IV-56.
' Id. at 56-57.
See Harry Smith Constr. Co. v. OSM, 78 IBLA 27 (1983) ("Where legislation is remedial, as
the Surface Mining Act is, 'exemptions from its sweep should be narrowed and limited to effect
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III. EXEMPT BY EXPRESS PROVISION IN THE ACT
Section 528 of SMCRA provides that three specific mining situations are
totally exempt from the requirements of the Act."5 Subsection (1) allows an
individual to be free of regulation when mining coal for his or her own non-
commercial use. Subsection (2) also removes from OSM authority any opera-
tion where the affected area is two acres or less. The third subsection ex-
empts coal extraction which is incidental to government-financed construc-
tion.
Section 528 appears somewhat out of place in such a broad, remedial act
as SMCRA. These express exemptions, at first glance, seem contrary to the
strict environmental objectives and requirements of the Act."' The legisla-
tive history, however, indicates that Congress felt that these three provisions
were warranted simply because the limited environmental damage caused in
these situations was not worth the extra burden which would be placed on
OSM if regulation of these comparatively miniscule operations was man-
dated."7 In fact, when explaining these exemptions, the Senate Committee on
Interior and Insular Affairs offered that "these three classes of surface min-
ing cause very little damage and ... regulation of them would place a heavy
burden on both the miner and the regulatory authority."'0 8
A. The "Own Use" Exemption-Section 528(1)
The first exemption has received little, if any, attention. This subsection
frees from OSM control "the extraction of coal by a landowner, for his own
noncommercial use from land owned or leased by him.""' 9 The permanent reg-
ulation which addresses the subject has not been changed, or even proposed
for change, since its promulgation in March of 1979."' The language of the
regulation parallels the language in the Act, except for an additional clarifica-
tion laid out in the regulation: the second sentence of regulation section
700.11(a) adds that "own noncommercial use" does not mean that manufactur-
ing or power plants with their own "captive" mines are exempt.
30 U.S.C. § 1278 (Supp. V 1981).
108 See 30 U.S.C. §§ 1202 and 1265 (Supp. V 1981).
i See 44 Fed. Reg. 14,949 (1979). In comparison, the Mine Safety and Health Act [30 U.S.C.
§§ 801-962], with its first-priority objective of the safety and health of all miners, evidences Con-
gress' intent to exercise its fullest federal legislative reach. See 30 U.S.C. § 803. See also S.R. No.
95-181 (Human Resources Committee), 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODS
CONG. & AD. NEWS 3401, 3414. ([I]t is the Committee's intention that what is considered to be a
mine and to be regulated under the Act be given the broadest possible interpretation . . ").
10 S. REP. No. 128, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 97-98 (1977); see also Blackwood Fuel Co., 2 IBSMA
359 (1980 (Mirkin, J., dissenting).
108 30 U.S.C. § 1278(1) (Supp. V 1981).
30 C.F.R. § 700.11(a) (1982).
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The second sentence of section 700.11(b) is essentially a regulatory after-
thought, where OSM was simply clarifying what it perceived to be Congress'
intent regarding this exemption."' Presumably, Congress felt, in adopting
section 528(1), that those individuals who dig a small amount of coal from
their land to keep their houses heated should be free to continue doing so un-
regualted. This type of activity poses no real environmental threat.
This "own use" exemption fits into the overall philosophy of SMCRA,
since the Act was designed to ensure that burdensome environmental costs
imposed by many commercial coal operations be internalized. By the use of
the word "noncommercial," Congress apparently meant to emphasize that
only personal consumption was to be exempted under section 528(1). An in-
dustrial plant digging and burning its own coal might make a plausible argu-
ment that its consumption is not only for its "own use," but also noncommer-
cial in the sense that it is not placing the coal into the stream of commerce.
But the coal is being used in a production process for some commercial pur-
pose, and no matter how low on the chain of production it is used, it is still
being put to a "commercial use".
"[O]ne seeking an exemption from the coverage of a statute [must] affir-
matively demonstrate entitlement to that treatment." ' Exemptions such as
this should be strictly construed so as not to contravene the objectives of the
legislation.' Given the broad, remedial purposes of SMCRA, it is consistent
with the Act to say that a "captive" mine situation is not a type of "own use"
that Congress intended to exempt. A contrary reading would only encourage
abuses. For example, there would then be strong incentive for a coal-burning
plant to locate on a large tract and mine out the surrounding coal unregu-
lated.
B. The "Incidental to Government Construction" Exemption-Section 528(3)
Section 528(3) of the Act exempts "the extraction of coal as an incidental
part of Federal, State or local government-financed highway or other con-
struction ....". "I The subsection of regulation 700.11 covering this exemption
mirrors the rather ambiguous language in the Act."6 Additionally, though,
part 707 1 of the regulations "limits the scope of the exemption in a manner
"1 See 44 Fed. Reg. 14,915 (1979).
"' See, e.g., Gulf States Utilities Co. v. Traigle, 310 So. 2d 78 (La. 1975) (automobiles used by
public utility employees were put to a "commercial use" within the meaning of the vehicle license
tax statute).
"I Daniel Bros. Coal Co., 2 IBSMA 45, 51, 87 Interior Dec. 138, 141 (1980).
". See Blackwood Fuel Co., 2 IBSMA 359, 367, 87 Interior Dec. 579, 584 (1980) (Mirkin, J., dis-
senting).
1 30 U.S.C. § 1278(3) (Supp. V 1981) (emphasis added).
"' 30 C.F.R. § 700.11(d) (1982).
.1 30 C.F.R. § 707.1, -.12 (1982).
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believed to be consistent with the congressional intent of Section 528 .... ,1l
With the clearly defined criteria set up in part 707, this exemption has re-
mained relatively free of controversy. The only two issues of any significance
have been challenges to the meanings of "incidental" and "government-fi-
nanced."
"Incidental" extraction of coal is strictly defined as only that amount
necessary to enable the construction to be accomplished."' In Concord Coal
Corp.,1"' The company agreed to build a county airport on a particular site for
a very reasonable price, primarily because it had intended to mine the coal
anyway. The Board ruled that because the company was removing more over-
burden and coal than was necessary for construction of the airport, their coal
extraction went beyond the section 707.5 necessity test for what was "inci-
dental.
121
Likewise, the term "government-financed" is given a narrow definition
and only exempts those projects where government involvement is signifi-
cant. Only if the construction is funded fifty percent or more by a govern-
ment agency or by government general revenue bonds will the project fall
within the definition of "government-financed." 1" This essentially has the ef-
fect of exempting only those projects where the government is deeply in-
volved in, or at least overseeing, the construction process and thus will be
concerned about the success of the overall project, including reclamation of
the construction site."'
These definitions and the rest of part 707 of the regulations combine to
make section 528(3) a very narrow exemption which could seldom be used,
much less abused. In an earlier bill, this exemption was originally drafted to
apply to all construction projects, whether funded privately or by the govern-
ment. No doubt realizing the potential for abuse inherent in such a broad ex-
emption, the final bill was amended to exempt only government-financed con-
struction. 24 The reason for substantially limiting the exemption to govern-
mental-financed projects is a valid one. Construction projects in the private
sector could often be superficially imposed upon what is predominantly a
mining operation which would otherwise circumvent the requirements of the
Act.1"
118 43 Fed. Reg. 41,672 (1978).
119 30 C.F.R. § 707.5 (1982) (emphasis added).
120 3 IBSMA 92, 88 Interior Dec. 456 (1981).
121 Id. at 98, 88 Interior Dec. at 459 ("[T]he extraction ... is not necessary, as a matter of en-
gineering, to facilitate that construction.").
30 C.F.R. § 707.5 (1982).
2 See West Virginia Energy, Inc., 3 IBSMA 301, 88 Interior Dec. 831 (1981).
124 See H.R. REP. No. 493, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 112 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 743.
2 See J.P.W. Co. v. Andrus, No. 80-193 (E.D. Ky. Jan. 29, 1981); Goebel Bartley, 4 IBSMA
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C. The "Two Acre" Exemption-Section 528(2)
1. Synopsis
Section 528(2) of SMCRA removes from OSM reach "the extraction of
coal for commercial purposes where the surface coal mining operation affects
two acres or less." 26 A regulation implementing this exemption was even-
tually promulgated under the permanent program. 27 Since then, this exemp-
tion has been the subject of considerable confusion, abuse and litigation. The
"two acre" exemption was presumably intended to allow the one or two per-
son "pick and shovel" operations, which cause little environmental harm, to
escape the Act's requirements." However, it quickly became what some com-
menters predicted- "a tremendous loophole which would be continuously
abused."1 9
Obviously, there is a substantial economic incentive for operations to find
ways to qualify for this exemption. If exempt, the operation can ignore all the
permitting and bonding requirements, performance standards and payments
to the reclamation fund. It is not surprising that the "two acre" issues are
hotly litigated ones. This is one exemption that many operators apparently
feel they have a chance of qualifying for, especially in the East where surface
mines tend to be smnaller.
With all the confusion and litigation, the section 700.11(b) regulation has
had a complicated history of various proposed revisions. 3 ' For one reason or
another all these were delayed and eventually withdrawn. Finally, on Sep-
tember 1, 1982, a new "two acre" regulation was put into effect. 1 ' Whether or
not this new regulation has solved all problems is not yet clear. The recent
cases discussed below illustrate the most common problem/abuse areas that
have arisen in past years under the old regulation. Whether the new regula-
tion provides the remedies needed is also addressed. Additionally, however, a
recent challenge to OSM's new "two acre" regulation may present serious
questions as to how broadly OSM can exercise their regulatory authority in
order to curb these abuses. 32
2. Problems and Abuses
The two broad areas which have been consistently problematic to a clear
219, 89 Interior Dec. 628 (1982); James Moore, 1 IBSMA 216, 86 Interior Dec. 369 (1977) (decided
under interim regs.).
1- 30 U.S.C. § 1278(2) (Supp. V 1981).
"2 44 Fed. Reg. 15,311 (1979) (codified at 30 C.F.R. § 700.11(b)).
1I See 47 Fed. Reg. 48 (1982).
11 44 Fed. Reg. 14,915 (1979).
1 See 47 Fed. Reg. 47 (1982); 47 Fed. Reg. 33,424 (1982).
,' 47 Fed. Reg. 33,424 (1982).
'2 Jaward Corp. v. Watt, 564 F. Supp. 797 (W.D. Va. 1983).
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resolution of the "two acre" exemption are: a) the affected area and roads is-
sues, and b) the related sites issues.
a. Affected areas and roads. A good definition of "affected area" is vital
to a workable "two acre" provision since section 528(2) exempts operations
which "affect two acres or less." The previous regulatory definition was al-
most no definition at all. It simply stated that, as to a surface mine, an af-
fected area was "any land or water upon or in which [surface mining activi-
ties] are conducted or located.""' This circular definition merely said that any
place there was mining activity (as defined in section 701) was an affected
place.
A federal court case which illustrates the fundamental shortcoming of
this definition is United States v. Dix Fork Coal Company.3' In Dix Fork, the
coal company claimed that its operation was exempt since its state-mining
permit covered only 1.84 acres. The company took the position that the area
of its operation was clearly defined by what the permit allowed it to mine.
The court, however, took a broader approach after noting that the evidence
showed that the coal company's operation had actually affected an area of
2.89 acres. The court stated, "[t]he only pertinent jurisdictional inquiry is the
acreage which was actually affected by the mining operation rather than the
acreage which was authorized to be affected.""' Without a clear statutory or
regulatory definition of "affects" in the Act to rely on, the court was still able
to apply the normal meaning of the word to the simple facts in this case.
The facts and circumstances of other cases were more complicated. The
Interior Board or a court, when presented with this issue, was inevitably left
with the question of what effects on areas outside the mine boundaries were
to be included. Situations such as coal waste piles or valley fills could clearly
be included in the acreage. But different types of roads associated with mines
have not been susceptible to clear answers. The "roads" issue has definitely
been the largest problem in this area, presenting a number of questions, such
as: Are access and haul roads always to be included in acreage computations?
What about public roads used incident to the mining? How much of a particu-
lar road is to be included when two or more mining operations use the same
road?
Under the definitions in the Act and regulations, access and haul roads
used with a mine site are part of the "surface coal mining operation.""' How-
ever, some coal companies began a practice of deeding their roads to local
44 Fed. Reg. 15,317 (1979).
692 F.2d 436 (6th Cir. 1982).
Id. at 438 (emphasis added). See also United States v. Signal Mining Co., No. 1-80-392 (E.D.
Tenn. July 27, 1981).
13' 30 U.S.C. § 1291(28)(B) (Supp. V 1981); 48 Fed. Reg. 20,400 (1983) (to be codified as amended
at 30 C.F.R. § 700.5).
[Vol. 861014
20
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 86, Iss. 3 [1984], Art. 18
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol86/iss3/18
JURISDICTION AND EXEMPTIONS
municipalities or counties (and coincidentally reducing their mine sites below
two acres at the same time). They then asserted that these "public" roads
were not a part of their operations and, therefore, could not be included in
the acreage computations. The Board never bought this argument, stating,
for example, that "the mere nominal status of a road as a 'public' road.., is
not sufficient to bring the road within the exclusionary language of 30 C.F.R.
710.5."M13 For a road to be excluded it had to be both public and publicly main-
tained. Under these "deed-over" schemes, the county was merely accepting
title and the coal companies were still maintaining the roads for their own
use.
While the Act states that roads are to be included as part of the opera-
tion," no definition of "roads" is present in the Act. The regulations, though,
have always defined them. The "roads" definition in interim regulation
710.5139 differed from the original permanent regulation definition of "roads"
in section 701.5. The 710.5 interim definition had explicitly stated that pub-
licly maintained roads were not "roads" for purposes of the definition; while
the original permanent regulation definition of "roads" in section 701.5 was
silent on the matter.1
40
The new OSM definition of "roads" is also silent on the public verses pri-
vate issue. 4' However, OSM also recently revised its "affected area" defini-
tion in such a fashion that the two definitions ("roads" and "affected area")
are intertwined.' This new definition not only made it clear that haulage and
access roads are to be counted as part of the "affected area," but also resolved
the public verses private road issue by establishing four criteria to aid in de-
termining when a road can be excluded from an "affected area" computation.
If the road is: 1) a legally designated public road, 2) maintained with public
funds, 3) constructed similarly to other roads of same type, and 4) substan-
tially used by the public, then even if it is frequently used by a coal company
for hauling and access it nevertheless will not be included when determining
affected acreage.
4 1
These criteria appear to be stringent enough to prevent any "deed-over"
practice from defeating the objectives of the Act. Even if a local government
would legally designate a road deeded to it as a public road, the company
would still have the burden of showing that the road was publicly main-
tained, similarly constructed and substantially used by the public. It is un-
11 Jewell Smokeless Co., 4 IBSMA 51, 89 Interior Dec. 313 (1982); see also L. & R. Mining
Co., 5 IBSMA 16 (1983). But see Jaward v. Watt, 564 F. Supp. 797, 801 (S.D. Va. 1983).
1 30 U.S.C. § 1291(28)(B) (Supp. V 1981).
13 42 Fed. Reg. 62,678 (1977) (codified at 30 C.F.R. § 710.5).
" 44 Fed. Reg. 15,320 (1979) (codified at 30 C.F.R. § 701.5).
"4 48 Fed. Reg. 22,122 (1983) (to be codified as amended at 30 C.F.R. § 701.5).
".. 48 Fed. Reg. 14,821-22 (1983) (to be codified as amended at 30 C.F.R. § 701.5).
"I Id. at 14,822.
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likely that all these criteria would be met, especially since not many local
governments would want to pay public monies for the expensive upkeep of
roads used solely by heavy coal trucks.
The other "roads" problem involves the issue of how much of a road
should be counted as part of each operation when more than one coal opera-
tion uses a particular road or segment thereof. It was simple enough to rule
that when only one company was using a haul road the entire road could be
attributed to that operator.'44 But often parts of one road are used by more
than one operation. The old regulations gave no answer to the questions of
whether to, and how to, proportion roads among two or more users.
Past Board decisions appear to have ambiguously ruled that a common
haul road should be proportioned among the users. ' The acreage questions
in these cases were not so critical that actual proportioning had to be calcu-
lated. Rather, the Board merely ruled that the operations were not within
the "two acre" exemption by simply stating that the common road "is prop-
erly attributed, at least in part, to each operator ...."I" These decisions and
the old regulations did not answer the close cases where the method of figur-
ing the amount of road to attribute to each operator may make a difference
on the two-acre exemption question.
The new "affected area" definition, together with the revised "two acre"
regulation, gives an absolutely clear answer to the road proportionment is-
sue. The "affected area" includes "every road used for purposes of access to,
or for hauling coal .... ""' But most significant is the revised "two acre" regu-
lation which leaves no doubt as to the method of computation by stating that
"[w]here a segment of a road is used ... by more than one ... operation, the
entire segment shall be included in the affected area of each of those opera-
tions."'48 In other words, for purposes of computing acreage, all of the road
used by an operation is counted, regardless of whether any other operations
use the same segment of road. The Interior Board of Land Appeals' has
even adopted this rationale in a case which arose before the adoption of these
new definitions. 150
.. See, e.g., Virginia Fuels, Inc., 5 IBSMA 1 (1983).
"5 See, e.g., Goebel Bartley, 4 IBSMA 219, 89 Interior Dec. 628 (1982); Virginia Fuels, 4
IBSMA 185, 89 Interior Dec. 604 (1982); Rhonda Coal Co., 4 IBSMA 124, 89 Interior Dec. 460
(1982).
Virginia Fuels, 4 IBSMA at 189.
14 48 Fed. Reg. 14,821 (1983) (to be codified as amended at 30 C.F.R. § 701.5).
,4 47 Fed. Reg. 33,431 (1982) (to be codified as amended at 30 C.F.R. § 700.11).
4 The Interior Board of Surface Mining and Reclamation Appeals was consolidated into the
Interior Board of Land Appeals on May 12, 1983, "in view of the declining number of appeals aris-
ing under [SMCRA]." 48 Fed. Reg. 22,370 (1983).
" Kimberly Sue Coal Co., 74 IBLA 170 (1983) ("The fact that the road is used by more than
one operator has no bearing on the determination.") Id. at 171-72.
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Therefore, multiple counting of the same road area will occur whenever
more than one operation uses all or part of the same road. This may be the
simplest and most practical method of coming up with consistent regulatory
results'51 that effectuate the intent of the Act to include within regulated sur-
face mining operations "all lands affected by the construction of new roads or
the improvement or use of existing roads to gain access to the site of such ac-
tivities and for haulage .... ,,,52 If a rule were adopted where roads were to be
apportioned equally according to the number of users or amounts of use, the
acreage of each operation using the road would constantly fluctuate as some
operations ceased or new ones opened up. However, the new rule pro-
mulgated by OSM may, in effect, remove the "two acre" exemption from the
reach of even the small operators which Congress intended to exclude from
the Act's jurisdiction.'53 The inclusion of all access and haul roads in the
acreage computation of each operation will mean only those small sites which
are fairly close to a public road will stay within this exemption.
b. Related sites. The second area of past confusion and abuse under the
"two acre" exemption is the "related sites" problem. Operators wanting to
take advantage of the "two acre" exemption have utilized various methods of
dividing up what is, in reality, one large mine site or operation into a number
of smaller sites of two acres or less. The most common abuses under the Act
have been: a) to mine two acres and then skip 50 or 100 feet and begin
again,"' or b) to divide a large tract into a number of two-acre sites which
would then be contract-mined by different operators." 5 OSM, when it promul-
gated the original permanent program regulations, had anticipated such
abuses but apparently believed the language of section 700.11(b) would suffic-
iently guard against them."5 Nevertheless, the above-mentioned evasive
practices (and others) arose, primarily because the regulation failed to define
what it meant by "physically related." Also, by speaking only in terms of
physical relationships, the regulation even further encouraged the practice of
contracting out two-acre sections.
The new "two acre" exemption"17 has attempted to close these avenues of
'"' See 47 Fed. Reg. 48-50 (1982) (discussion of five proposed alternatives for treating roads
used by more than one operation).
I-' SMCRA § 701(28); 30 U.S.C. § 1291(28) (Supp. V 1981). See also H.R. REP. No. 95-218, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 128 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 593, 660.
" See Jaward Corp. v. Watt, 564 F. Supp. 797, 801 (W.D. Va. 1983) ("[T]o include the area of
roads that were not even built in connection with the mine, in calculating the total mine area,
could prove to be unreasonable.").
' See, e.g., Mullins & Bolling Contractors, 4 IBSMA 156, 89 Interior Dec. 475 (1982).
See, e.g., Capital Coal Corp., CH 1-157-R (March 16, 1982).
in See 44 Fed. Reg. 14,915 (1979).
, 47 Fed. Reg. 33,432 (1982) (to be codified as amended at 30 C.F.R. § 700.11(b)). See also 48
Fed. Reg. 14,814, 14,821 (1983) (based upon analysis of this revised "two acre" regulation in OSM's
supplemental Environmental Impact Statement, the revised regulation shall remain as adopted).
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abuse, not by changing the scope of the exemption's originally intended avail-
ability, but by adopting clearly defined criteria for determining what opera-
tions are "related" and thus are to be counted together when determining
whether the exemption applies. The new regulation includes one subsection
devoted solely to defining related operations. 58 This "relatedness" test is
comprised of three components, all three being necessary before two or more
operations will be defined as related. Operations are only considered related
when: 1) they occur within twelve months of each other, 2) are physically re-
lated and 3) are commonly owned or controlled. The last two criteria incor-
porate both a "physical relatedness" test and an "ownership or control" test
into the new overall relatedness definition. The "physical relatedness" test is
aimed at ending abuses such as skipping 100t feet between two-acre sites. If
the drainage from two operations "flows into the same watershed at or be-
fore a point within five aerial miles of either operation," then the two sites
are physically related.159 While this definition will make reasonably adjacent
operations physically related, that alone will not make the sites "related"
under the new section 700.11(b). The operations still have to come under both
the time and the ownership/control criteria before their acreage is counted
together.
The "ownership/control" test is a rather complex definition which essen-
tially says that if a person, persons or entity has control, whether it be by
law, contract, or mere proven ability in fact over the different operations,
then they are under common ownership or control.16 This test should effec-
tively curb the exemptions -claimed by coal owners and lessors who contract
out their mining to separate "two acre" contractors; or where an operator at
one site sets up a "shell" corporation to begin mining nearby. Previously,
under the old regulation, the Board had been compelled to create its own
economic integration doctrine in an attempt to limit these kinds of avoidance
schemes. But this doctrine was not developed fully enough to be applied con-
sistently."' The new regulation's "common ownership or control" definition
provides clear, uniform guidelines which should lead to more consistent
results, according separate site status only to those operations being mined
by truly different entities.
Discussion of the twelve-month criterion was reserved for last because it
presents the most significant threat to the effectiveness of the comprehen-
sive regulatory definition of "relatedness" in the new "two acre" regulation.
The problem can be approached best by first looking at the old regulation., 2
Id. at § 700.11(b)(2).
Id. at § 700.11(b)(2)(i) (emphasis added).
'o Id. at § 700.11(b(2){ii), -(2)(iii).
,6, See, e.g., S. & M. Coal & Jewell Smokeless Coal, CH 2-31-R (Mar. 25, 1982); W. D. Martin,
CH 2-29-R (Mar. 11, 1982).
162 44 Fed. Reg. 15,315 (1979).
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There was a twelve-month time factor involved in the old regulation, but it
only applied to physically unrelated sites. The "two acre" exemption was not
available "at physically related sites, or . ..at physically unrelated sites
within one year."" In other words, under the former regulation, "physically
related sites" (which was not defined) operated by the same or economically
integrated entities would always be counted together no matter how much
time elapsed between the mining operations at the sites.
The time period in the former regulation was adopted simply because
OSM realized that without a time factor, an operator would only be allowed
one "two acre" exemption in his or her lifetime. 4 The compromise solution
built in with the one-year time factor in the old regulation was that the ex-
emption could not ever be used on two related sites of an operator, but oper-
ators could still be allowed one exemption per year on physically unrelated
sites. This compromise was designed to prevent abuse and still carry out the
intended purpose of the exemption-to avoid unduly burdening the small
"pick and shovel" operator.'5
Even though the new "two acre" regulation eliminates some abuses by
better defining overall "relatedness," it may have over-defined the term. The
new section 700.11(b) applies the twelve-month factor to physically related
operations. This opens up a wide avenue for abuse that was not present
under the former regulation. For example, an operator can now lease a num-
ber of large tracts which are not physically related (i.e., will not drain into
same watershed at a point within five miles). In the Appalachian area, espe-
cially, these could all be located within the same county. Then, the operator
can remain exempt from the Act by "phasing" the mining, still being able to
completely mine out each tract. This can be done by mining two acres at one
tract, then moving to another tract, and so on. Once two acres have been
mined from each tract, one year having passed, the operator can begin a new
two-acre mine back at the first tract mined and begin the cycle over again.
Eventually, all tracts could be completely mined out without ever coming
under OSM jurisdiction.
This could not have happened under the old regulation since the twelve-
month factor never applied to physically related sites. The new regulation
gives operators an implied license to operate exempt under a phased mining
method. Since all three criteria must be met before two sites are "related,"
the anomalous result is that two sites immediately adjacent to one another
will be defined as totally unrelated simply if they are mined twelve months
apart.
While the above "phasing" practice may not be economically feasible for
163 Id.
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most operations, there is little doubt that it would be attractive to some oper-
ators. Since it is quite likely that this would often be much cheaper than the
costs of permitting, meeting performance standards, bonding, and paying re-
clamation fund fees under SMCRA, there are strong economic incentives to
find ways of utilizing such a method of operation. Those operations which
avoid SMCRA requirements will place all the operations which comply in
good faith at a competitive disadvantage.
One way to avoid this abuse of the otherwise effective new regulation
would be to either remove the twelve-month criterion from the overall "re-
latedness" test or to increase the time period so substantially that it would
not be economically feasible to create a "phased" operation. Such an opera-
tion, to work profitably, now needs only enough tracts to complete the cycle
in one year. If the time factor was increased substantially, for example, to
five or ten years, it would greatly diminish the likelihood of an economically
viable "phased" operation since a very large number of physically unrelated
tracts would be required to make the cycle. However, this would mean that
the bonafide small operators would be limited to one exemption every five or
ten years.
A better solution would be to remove the twelve-month factor from the
"relatedness" test but keep it in the regulation. This could be done by adding
another subsection to 700.11(b) which would allow the "two acre" exemption
on unrelated sites if twelve months apart. This way, sites would be related,
and remain related, if only two criteria are met, the "physical relatedness"
and "common ownership/control" tests. Unrelated sites would then always be
on separate tracts, and the exemption would again be available on a once-per-
year basis. This solution would prevent abuse and still be fair by not limiting
the exemption to once a lifetime. The definitional effectiveness of the new
regulation would be combined with the fairness of the old regulation.
IV. CONCLUSION
An initial conclusion which can easily be drawn from a reading of
SMCRA and its history is that Congress intended its reach to be broad and
all-inclusive. While it is clear that the object of the Act is to preserve our coal
industry as well as our environment, the focus of the Act is on environmental
vigilance. The intended result is to allow surface mining to continue but have
a complete internalization of the costs.
The experience of the first few years under the Act has shown that it can
be very difficult to apply this Act consistently and effectively under ambig-
uous definitions and exemptions. This is true even when courts are aware
that SMCRA should be strictly construed in order to accomplish its goals.
Some of the jurisdictional provisions in SMCRA, such as the section 701(13)
and (28) definitions, have been fairly effective. These have needed only some
fine-tuning via court interpretations and OSM clarifications in the regula-
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tions. However, other provisions, most notably the "two acre" exemption,
have needed considerable revision from the outset.
The evolutionary process of legal challenge and agency rule revision has
been particularly characteristic of the section 528 exemptions, most notably
the "two acre" exemption. There has been a common trend in the revisions of
these regulations which may indicate what is required for these types of
strict regulatory provisions to be consistent and effective. In each of these
cases, these definitional regulations have steadily moved toward a heavy em-
phasis on specific criteria. Many of the regulations replaced the broader
language that made them subject to confusion and abuse, with definition by
criteria. These criteria tests seem to be well-suited to laws such as SMCRA,
where one objective is strict enforcement across-the-board with very limited
exemptions. Nevertheless, as the new "two acre" regulation illustrates, if
criteria tests are used, they can also drastically reduce effectiveness by being
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